

IN REF B REFLECTS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, A LACK OF SOLID EVIDENCE
THAT ARMED FORCES PREPARED TO MOVE IN DECISIVE MANNER AGAINST
ALLENDE REGIME AND THAT OPPOSITION. ESPECIALLY PDC. WOULD
SUPPORT SUCH A MOVE. IF OUR ASSUMPTION CORRECT. AGREE THAT
NATURE AND FORM OF MILITARY ACTION AGAINST ALLENDE REGIME
IS STILL EVOLVING, AS WELL AS THE ATTITUDES OF THE PDC IN THIS
CONNECTION. HOWEVER, BOTH OF THESE KEY GROUPS ARE STEADILY
MOVING TOWARD SOME KIND OF MILITARY INTERVETION.

PERHAPS ET MOULD BE BETTER TO POSTPONE

PRESENTATION TO AND AND UNTIL WE GET HORE
EVIDENCE THAT MILITARY IS BREPARING TO MOVE AND THAT SUCH A
MOVE WOULD BE FOAVORED BY ALL OPPOSITION PARTIES, INCLUDING PDC.

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PLS ADVISE

- 2. IN CONNECTION WITH HOS CONSIDERATION OF ABOVE, BELIEVE FOLLOWING STATION VIEWS WHICH WERE PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO MAY BE OF INTEREST.
- BUREAUCRATIC CONSIDERATIONS ASIDE, DYNAMCIS OF PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION CLEARLY POINT TO OPTION B OF AS THE MOST INDICATED COURSE OF ACTION WE SHOULD PURSUE DURING FOLLOWING SIX TO NINE MONTHS: FIRST, THERE IS A GROWING ANTI-GMYT AMBIENCE IN ALL THREE MILITARY SERVICES AND AN INCREASING REALIZATION ON THEIR PART THAT SOME KIND OF ACTION BY THEM TO INTERVENE IN PRESENT SITUATION SOONER OR LATER WILL BE CALLED FOR. SECOND, THE DETERMINATION OF THE U.P. TO PUSH ITS REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM WITH RENEWED VIGOR AND THE COMMENSURATE RESPONSE OF THE DEPOSITION TO RESIST AND BLOCK THIS THRUST HAS CREATED THE CONDITIONS FOR AN ACUTE POLITICAL CRISIS. (WE ARE NOW IN THE BEGINNING PHASES OF THIS CRISIS WITH ROLITICAL TENSION STEADILY RISING IN SPITE OF PERIODIC LULLS) THIRD, THE MOST MILITANT PARTS OF THE OPROSITION: THE GREMIALISTAS. THE PN. SP&L. AND THE

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CREATION OF CONFLICT AND CONFRONTATION WHICH WILL LEAD TO SOME SORT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION. NONE HAVE A CLEAR IDEA HOW THIS IS TO HAPPEN OR WHAT FORM IT WILL TAKE. EACH IN ITS OWN WAY IS TRYING TO COORDINATE ITS EFFORTS WITH MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES KNOWN TO THEM WHO SHARE THIS OBJECTIVE...

AN ORGANIZATION (ALTHO CERTAIN LEADERS ALREADY FAVOR IT AND MORE CAN BE EXPECTED TO DO SO AS THE CRISIS DEEPENS). IT IS DETERMINED TO RESIST THE EXQUESSES OF THE ALLENDE REGIME. AT THE MOMENT THE PDC IS IN DIRECT AND SERIOUS CONFLICT WITH THE U.P. WHILE THIS PHASE COULD PASS. WE EXPECT SIMILAR CONFRONTATIONS TO ARISE IN THE WEEKS AHEAD. EXCEPT FOR THE PDC AS AN ORGANIZATION. THE PLANNING FOCUS AND ACTION OF ALL THE OPPOSITION FORCES IS ON THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AHEAD RATHER THAN ON 1976. IF WE ARE TO MAXIMIZE DUR INFLUENCE AND HELP THE OPPOSITION IN THE WAY IT NEEDS HELP. WE SHOULD HORK WITHIN THIS TREND RATHER THAN TRY TO OPPOSE AND COUNTER IT BY TRYING TO GET THE OPPOSITION AS A WHOLE TO FOCUS ON THE DISTANT AND TENUOUS GOAL OF 1976. IN SUM, WE BELIEVE THE ORIENTATION.

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FOCUS, AND THRUST OF OUR OPERATIONAL EFFORT SHOULD BE ON MILITARY INTERVENTION.

- 5. THE FORM THAT MILITARY INTERVENTION WOULD TAKE IS SITLL UNCLEAR, BUT WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MORE CONSISTENT WITH CHILEAN SENSIBILITIES AND MAKEUP FOR INTERVENTION TO TAKE THE FORM OF REENTRANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES INTO THE GOVT AS A UNIFIED INSTITUTION. THEIR REENTRANCE COULD BE TRIGGERED BY SERIOUS INTERNAL CONFLICT AND CRISIS. IN SUCH A PERIOD OF CRISIS WE WOULD VISUALIZE THE COMMANDERS IN CHIEFS OF THE ARMED FORCES APPROACHING THE PRESIDENT EITHER AT HIS REQUEST OR ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRISIS TO DISCUSS WHAT SHOULD BE DONE. THE ARMED FORCES AT THAT POINT WOULD BE PREPARED TO PRESENT THE PRESIDENT WITH SEVERAL VERY STIFF DEMANDS. HONEVER, IF THE MILITARY DEMANDS WERE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE BRESIDENT. THE ARMED FORCES WOULD PROBABLY ALSO HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO TAKE OVER COMPLETE.
- TAKE ONE OR TWO BASIC FORMS: (A) DELEGATE TO THE ABOVE COULD THE PRINCIPAL TASK, OF COORDINATING THE VARIOUS OPPOSITION

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POWER GROUPS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN OVERALL PLAN IN

CONNECTION WITH A PREPARED TIMETABLE WITH PLAYING

A SUPPLEMENTARY ROLE THRU ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH THE KEY

LEADERS OF THE CONSPIRATORIAL GROUP IN THE ARMY.

WE WOULD EXPECT A SERIOUS COUP GROUP

OR LEADER TO WANT TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH AT

SOME POINT.

WOULD BE IN AN EXCELLENT POSITION TO CARRY OUT THIS

ROLE. (B) - A SECOND ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE FOR

ITSELF TO PLAY THE DOMINANT COGRDINATING ROLE. THIS WOULD

INVOLVE.

SINCE

THERE ARE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES IN EACH APPROACH. THIS ASPECT WOULD NEED TO BE GIVEN MORE STUDY BEFORE A FINAL DECISION MADE AS TO WHICH WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE AND SECURE.

7. WHILE THE WHOLE FOCUS OF OUR EFFORT WOULD BE KEYED
TO MILITARY INTERVENTION, HE WOULD NEED TO PROVIDE SOME FUNDS

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